Beijing has finally achieved its aspiration to be a force to be reckoned with on the high seas. The long-awaited launch of China’s aircraft carrier signaled the incremental readjustment of power relations in East Asia. However, the rise of one power does not necessarily translate to the decline of all others in the vicinity. The rise of China as a naval power will inevitably highlight the indispensability of Japan and prompt Tokyo’s ascent to a position of greater political and military importance in Northeast Asia. 

Recently, Professor Robert Farley drew parallels between military conditions today and those in the 1920s when Japan and the United States challenged the naval supremacy of Great Britain. [1] Noting the economic burden of an arms race, he lauded the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty and recommended a new treaty between India, China and Japan to limit the size of their fleets. 

However, Beijing has yet to show any signs of budgetary or economic difficulties in providing for massive naval buildup. Furthermore, considering how internal opposition to naval arms control in Japan in the 1920s ultimately caused Tokyo to withdraw from the treaty in 1934, there is no reason to believe Beijing would abide by, much less initiate, control measures on its own longtime military objectives. 

In addition, just as advancements in naval aviation undermined the effectiveness of the 1922 Washington Treaty, future advancements in maritime military technology may well void any agreements that the nations forge today. 

Responding to the new political, economic and military realities in the west Pacific, Japan will have an increasingly pivotal role in diplomacy and security in East Asia. Three reasons already make Japan a natural counterweight to the growing influence of China. First, Japan maintains significant diplomatic relations with all the regional players and can act as a regional arbiter; second, upholding Japan’s territorial integrity will contain China’s surface fleet; third, Japan is militarily capable of contributing to regional security. 

It’s been noted that when a country is an economic giant, it will inevitably be a political giant as well. [2] Japan has used its economic prowess to deepen its diplomatic contacts throughout the region since regaining its autonomy in 1952. After normalizing relations with South Korea in 1965, Japan also made diplomatic overtures to North Korea. 

Although Tokyo has yet to recognize the government in Pyongyang, Japan was the first capitalist country that North Korea turned to for trade and investment. [3] Most importantly, North Korea still desires greater political and economic interaction with Japan. This ongoing relationship places Tokyo in a key position to be involved in inter-Korean negotiations as an arbiter. 

Japan also consistently sought closer economic and diplomatic ties with both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. Although the dispute over the Kurile Islands have long soured the relations between Moscow and Tokyo, since the mid-1990s successive Japanese governments have pursued general economic linkage with Russia rather than previous attempts to trade economic aid for territorial concessions. 

The 1997 Yeltsin-Hashimoto Plan committed Japan to the economic development of the Russian far east and Sakhalin Island, promising continued investments that Moscow desperately needs to reach its long-desired goal of exploiting the vast reserve of natural resources in Siberia. [4] These economic ties with Russia provide Japan with inexorable political capital that can be leveraged to further stabilize and secure the region against sudden changes in the balance of power.

Geographically, Japan’s deep reach into the East China Sea also makes Tokyo a key player in the strategy to limit Beijing’s naval force. The dispute over the Senkaku islands (called the Diaoyu by China) arose in full in the 1990s when China leveraged its burgeoning political status in East Asia to extend its territorial claims. 

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force frequently infringed on Japanese air space and showed interest in exploiting the mineral resources around the contested islands. With the completion of an aircraft carrier, Beijing’s capacity to further up-the-ante in disputed waters has drastically increased. Thus it is not surprising that Japan’s 2011 Defense White Papers cited the growth of China’s military reach as a key security concern. 

Although Washington has always maintained an ambiguous position regarding its obligations in the case of a Chinese incursion of the Senkaku islands, in December 1996, the Pentagon did note that the islands were included in the terms of the US-Japan Okinawa Reversion Treaty of 1971, thus lending weight to Japan’s position over China’s claim.

The United States prevails upon a more diplomatically viable position of sustaining the status quo in Northeast Asia; Dokdo to South Korea, the Kurile Islands to the Russian Federation and the Senkaku Islands to Japan. This diplomatic and military coalition remains the most practical means of keeping China’s ambitions at bay. Therefore, Tokyo’s position regarding its concept of territorial integrity has significant bearing on the direction of multilateral cooperation. 

Japan is also increasingly capable of contributing to the security of Northeast Asia. The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force maintains six guided missile destroyers built around the Aegis combat system and it plans on expanding its helicopter carrier fleet which could eventually accommodate F-35 jet fighters, fifth generation stealth fighters capable of vertical launch and landing. 

New guidelines established in Japan’s 2011 Defense White Papers stated that Tokyo intended to augment the defense capabilities of its southern frontier by improving the Self Defense Force’s and mobility and response-readiness. 

Japan’s diplomatic, military and economic role in the security of the region fulfills the role that Tokyo sought since the 1960s and 1970s when prime minister Eisaku Sato and president Richard Nixon discussed the possibility of Japan playing a larger role in the security of Northeast Asia.

With the nation coping with the consequences of the nuclear disaster at Fukushima and the Democratic Party of Japan failing to show political leadership and assertiveness, current conditions at home look grim. However, it is also taking forward steps to bolster its political position in the region. 

New Prime Minister, Noda Yoshihiko decided not to visit the controversial Yaskuni Shrine, thereby reducing potential areas of conflict with South Korea and China. Furthermore, the proposed joint naval exercises between Russia, Japan and the United States, the intrinsic economic and political ties with Seoul and its diplomatic contacts with Pyongyang stands as a testament to Tokyo’s increasingly predominant political role in the region. [5]

The next decade will be as much Japan’s decade as it will be China’s.

Notes 

1. Robert Farley, “Over the Horizon: Toward a Tokyo Naval Treaty?” World Politics Review, August 17, 2011. 

2. GerdLeptin noted this explicitly in a lecture given at FreieUniversitat Berlin in April 1994. 

3. Armstrong, Charles. “Juche and North Korea’s Global Aspirations.” NKIDP Working Paper #1, Apr. 2009.

4. Randall E Newnham, “How to Win Friends and Influence People: Japanese Economic Aid Linkage and the Kurile Islands.” Asian Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Winter, 2001), pp. 247-260.

5. “Russia, in order to contain China, to conduct joint naval exercises with Japan and United States.” Yonhap News (article in Korean), September 1, 2011. Citation suggests Nihon KeizaiShimbun as the original source.

(Source: Asia Times Online)

Chinese territorial claims propel science into choppy waters.

Clashes at sea. Disputed borders. It is not the usual stuff of science. But researchers and scientific journals are being pulled into long-simmering border disputes between China and its neighbours. Confrontations involving research vessels are raising tensions in the region, while the Chinese government is being accused of using its scientists’ publications to promote the country’s territorial claims.

Mine, all mine: the rush to claim minerals and oil is driving China’s marine ambitions. Source: CHINAFOTOPRESS/GETTY

China’s desire to increase its exploitation of the sea is no secret. The country’s 12th five-year plan, which covers 2011�?5 and was approved in March, was the first to mention the importance of a marine economy. In May, China’s Ocean Development Report estimated that marine industries, including offshore oil and gas exploration, fisheries and ship building, will earn 5.3 trillion renminbi (US$830 billion) by 2020. Last month, Zhang Jixian, head of the Chinese Academy of Surveying and Mapping, announced that the country will ramp up efforts to chart what he described as its “three million square kilometres of water territory”, an area much larger than that considered by neighbouring states to be Chinese territory. The mapping project will be aided by China’s first cartographic satellite, to be launched in December, and the Jiaolong submersible, which is scheduled to take humans to ocean depths of 7,000 metres next year. If the dive succeeds, China will capture the record for the deepest-ever manned ocean exploration from its great marine rival, Japan.

China is also growing increasingly assertive over its boundaries (see map). China claims Taiwan, for example, whereas Taiwan claims that it is independent. Japan, China and Taiwan all claim the uninhabited Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. The clashes are fiercest in the South China Sea, where China claims the Paracel Islands (home to turtles, seabirds and a few Chinese troops) and the Spratly Islands, an archipelago of more than 700 isles, along with a huge area of the South China Sea surrounding them. Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei and the Philippines all argue that those areas fall within their exclusive economic zones, which are recognized by the United Nations. The disputes are decades old, but reports of oil deposits �?estimated at anywhere from 1.6 billion to 21.3 billion recoverable barrels �?and significant mineral resources are now raising the stakes.

Because exploration often goes hand in hand with research, scientists are finding themselves on the front line. In June, Vietnam accused a Chinese fishing vessel of ramming a seismic survey ship working for the state energy company, PetroVietnam. And on 26 September, Japan ordered a Chinese research vessel that seemed to be conducting a marine survey to leave the exclusive economic zone that Japan claims around the Senkaku Islands.

The battle is also spilling over to the pages of scientific journals. Critics say that Chinese researchers are trying to make their country’s possession of the South China Sea a fait accompli by routinely using maps that show its extended marine boundaries. For example, a 2010 review of the impacts of climate change on water resources and agriculture in China, published in Nature, included a map with an inserted area that implied that most of the South China Sea was part of China.

Last month, in an online posting that was also sent to Nature and other journals, 57 Vietnamese scientists, engineers and other professionals living around the world complained about the use of such maps. The letter laments the Chinese government’s use of “‘back door’ tactics”, and argues that it is “using your magazine/journal as a means to legitimize such [a] one-sided and biased map”. A map that appeared in a review of Chinese demography published in Science provoked similar criticism. Science responded with an Editor’s Note stating that the journal “does not have a position with regard to jurisdictional claims” but that it is “reviewing our map acceptance procedures to ensure that in the future Sciencedoes not appear to endorse or take a position on territorial/jurisdictional disputes”.

Meanwhile, Michael Oppenheimer, a geoscientist at Princeton University, New Jersey, who is co-editor of Climatic Change, has received a barrage of e-mails since June from scientists contesting a Chinese map that his journal published more than four years ago. The map includes a thick ‘cow-tongue’ shaped dotted line that claims for China a wide swathe of the South China Sea, reaching down towards Malaysian Borneo. The scientists, from Vietnam, Finland, Canada and elsewhere, are demanding a correction to the map. But this kind of highly politicized debate over territory “is not a question that a journal like ours wants to deal with”, says Oppenheimer.

Other Vietnamese scientists contacted by Nature were most angered by instances of what they consider to be gratuitous uses of the cow-tongue map. “They include the line around the South China Sea even when this region, and the islands within it, have absolutely zero relevance to the topic,” says Q. Tuan Pham, a chemical engineer at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia.

Why Chinese scientists include the controversial map in their papers is not clear. Following the e-mails, Oppenheimer decided that the disputed map had no relevance to the conclusion of the paper in question, and suggested that the lead author, Xuemei Shao of the Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research in Beijing, change it. Shao refused, explaining in an e-mail that the figure “is requested by the Chinese government”.

Jingyun Fang, a climate-change specialist at Peking University in Beijing who was a co-author on the Nature review, says that he included the insert because “we should follow China’s law to include these Chinese seas in the map”. Neither Fang, Shao nor any of four authors of other articles that included similar maps responded to requests from Nature for details of these regulations.

Science, Nature and Climatic Change have ultimately decided not to remove the offending maps. But Tuan Nguyen, a professor of medicine at the Garvan Institute of Medical Research in Sydney, who has independently complained to journal editors about China’s maps of the South China Sea, says that maps in journals should be treated as scientific data and verified before publication. “The publication of such a map represents an abuse of science,” he says.

(Source: Nature)

Political maps that seek to advance disputed territorial claims have no place in scientific papers. Researchers should keep relationships cordial by depoliticizing their work.

Muhammad Ali observed that the wars of nations are fought to change maps �?and he was a man who knew how to fight. Yet there are more subtle ways to change maps. Take the South China Sea: Chinese officials insist that much of its waters belong to China, and Chinese maps tend to include a dotted line that makes the same point. Yet there is no international agreement that China should have possession, and other countries have overlapping claims.

What has this to do with science and Nature? Nothing �?except that territorial disputes, including that over the South China Sea, are leaking into the pages of scientific journals such as this one. In a disturbing trend, an increasing number of maps included in scientific articles by Chinese researchers feature a dotted line that envelops almost the entire South China Sea, to indicate Chinese possession. Scientists and citizens of surrounding countries are understandably peeved by the maps, which in most cases are completely unrelated to the subjects of the papers in which they are published. The inclusion of the line is not a scientific statement �?it is a political one, apparently ordered by the Chinese government. It’s a territorial claim, and it’s being made in the wrong place.

Where research and politics mix, science should be a tool of diplomacy, not territorial aggression. Even politically hostile environments can prove fertile ground for scientific collaborations. An increasing number of researchers from Taiwan are teaming up with colleagues in mainland China, even as Beijing and Taipei continue to fundamentally disagree over their relationship. According to data provided by Lou-Chuang Lee, the head of Taiwan’s National Science Council, the number of research papers resulting from cross-strait collaborations rose from 521 in 2005 to 1,207 last year.

Such collaborations set the stage for the realization of common interests and, one might hope, resolution of political differences. At the least, they could help to restrain aggression.

Still, politics does often find a way to intrude. In August, for example, Ann-Shyn Chiang, director of the Brain Research Center at the National Tsing Hua University in Hsinchu, Taiwan, was surprised by a request from Yi Rao, a neuroscientist at Peking University in Beijing, with whom he was writing a paper. Rao wanted to put down Chiang’s affiliation as ‘Taiwan, China’, the appellation preferred by Beijing. Chiang told Rao either to use Taiwan or Taiwan ROC (Republic of China), or to drop his name from the author list.

Eventually the two found a compromise, agreeing that they would use Taiwan, Republic of China. The dispute over the South China Sea, with its resources and geopolitical significance, won’t be so easily ironed out.

With regard to this and other international disputes, Nature takes the position that scientists should stick to the science. Authors should try to depoliticize their articles as much as possible by avoiding inflammatory remarks, contentious statements and controversial map designations. If such things can’t be avoided, for example if a study of a country’s resources requires taking account of whether a certain island belongs to it, the map should be marked as ‘under dispute’ or something to that effect. In papers in Nature, editors reserve the right to insert such a label if authors fail to do so. By avoiding controversy, researchers who keep politics from contaminating their science will keep the doors of collaboration open, and their studies will benefit. Researchers could also, as a by-product, help to defuse political tensions, show the way to mutual benefit and perform a diplomatic service.

Researchers on all sides have much in common, as many scientists in parts of the world made unstable by conflict can appreciate. It makes no sense to undermine this solidarity through irrelevant political and territorial posturing.

(Source: Nature)

It would be rather absurd if England were to try to claim sovereignty over most of the English Channel, Iran the Persian Gulf, Thailand the Gulf of Thailand, Vietnam the Gulf of Tonkin, Japan the Sea of Japan, or Mexico the Gulf of Mexico.

But that is exactly what China is trying to do by claiming most of the South China Sea, a body of water about the size of the Mediterranean Sea bordered by nine nations plus Taiwan, and the main gateway between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. 

Although there are long-standing territorial disputes over the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands, the biggest security risk for the South China Sea is not the conflicting claims over these tiny islands and rocks but China’s outright claim to this strategically important body of water. 

Most international experts on maritime disputes, including even some Chinese ones, regard China’s claim to be inconsistent with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China’s claim is represented by the so-called “U-shaped line” or “nine-dashed line” map that depicts a line encircling most of the South China Sea. 

This map was first published by the Republic of China in 1948 under the heading “Map of the locations of the South China Sea Islands”. The name indicates that it was a map of the islands within the U-shaped line, not a claim to the entire maritime space. At that time international law only allowed a claim of territorial sea up to three nautical miles, beyond which was considered international waters. 

For decades, this map has remained obscure. Until now Chinese scholars have disagreed on what the map means and its legal basis. China’s own territorial sea declaration in 1958 only claimed 12 nautical miles and declared that international waters separated its mainland and the islands which it claimed. In other words, China’s own declaration then affirmed that most of the maritime space within the U-shaped line map was international waters. 

With newfound wealth after successful economic reforms launched in the 1980s and more recent rising naval strength, China’s territorial ambitions have grown to encompass not just the disputed Paracels and Spratlys but also most of the South China Sea. Consequently, China resurrected the U-shaped line map as if it were a claim to maritime space dating back to 1948, whereas in fact it was a map about the position of islands and by law it could never have been a legitimate claim to maritime space. 

In the 1990s, China started to make claims to some oil blocks within the U-shaped line in and near the Nam Con Son Basin between Vietnam and Indonesia. In 2009, China included the U-shaped line map in notes verbales to the United Nations’ Commission on the Limit of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to assert its maritime claim. This was the first time China sent the U-shaped line map to an intergovernmental body. 

Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines responded with their own notes verbales to the CLCS to reject China’s claim and the U-shaped line map. Vietnam’s notes maintained that China’s claim as represented by the U-shaped line “has no legal, historical or factual basis, therefore is null and void.” Indonesia’s note said that the U-shaped line map “clearly lacks international legal basis and is tantamount to upset the UNCLOS 1982.” The Philippines’ note said that China’s claim to most of the South China Sea “would have no basis under international law, specifically UNCLOS”. 

Instead of being deterred, China is becoming more assertive. In March 2011, two Chinese patrol ships threatened to ram a vessel that was carrying out seismic survey at the Reed Bank on behalf of the Philippines. According to the Philippines, the Reed Bank is not part of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) belonging to the Spratlys.

In May 2011, a Chinese maritime survey ship cut the seismic sensor cable of a Vietnamese survey ship operating in an area closer to Vietnam’s continental coast than to the disputed Paracels and Spratlys. In June 2011, Chinese fishing boats deliberately ran across the seismic sensor cable of another Vietnamese survey ship which was also operating in an area closer to Vietnam’s continental coast than to the disputed Paracels and Spratlys. 

Regarding these incidents, on June 27, the US Senate unanimously passed a resolution in which it “deplores the use of force by naval and maritime security vessels from China in the South China Sea.” The resolution also noted that one of the incidents “occurred within 200 nautical miles of Vietnam, an area recognized as its Exclusive Economic Zone”. 

In August 2011, the Philippines challenged China to take the dispute to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea. China did not accept the challenge, which the Philippines took to underline the fact that China’s claim is weak in law. 

In the latest episode in September, China warned India that joint exploration with Vietnam in the latter’s Blocks 127 and 128 amounted to a violation of China’s sovereignty – despite the fact that these blocks were much closer to Vietnam’s continental coasts than to the disputed Paracels and Spratlys. 

China justified its position by saying that, “The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea does not entitle any country to extend its exclusive economic zone or continental shelf to the territory of another country.” In effect, China is trying to use the “historical claims and rights” argument to negate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 

According to international law, no nation can claim Blocks 127 and 128 as its sovereign territory. Legally speaking, as an area submerged under the sea, these blocks are not “susceptible to sovereignty”, i.e., they cannot be claimed as the territory of any country. Therefore, Blocks 127 and 128 can only be maritime space governed by international law. According to international law, in 1947 that area was international waters, and today it is part of Vietnam’s EEZ.

Regarding the “historical claims and rights” argument, at the Third Biennial Conference of the Asian Society of International Law in August 2011, the Indonesian Ambassador to Belgium, Luxembourg and the European Union obliquely dismissed it as being “at best ridiculous” as follows, … the “historic claims of historic waters” is problematic for Asia because Asia is a region rich with ancient kingdoms which were both land and maritime powers. Srivijaya Kingdom which has its capital in Sumatra island in seventh century ruled many parts of Southeast Asia and spanned its control all the way to Madagascar. For Indonesia to claim waters corresponding to its history would be at best ridiculous. 

Clearly, if nations were allowed to use the “historical claims and rights” argument to claim vast swathes of the world’s oceans and seas at the expense of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – which stipulates that coastal nations have an EEZ of up to 200 nautical miles – it would make a mockery of the Convention. For example, the “historical claims and rights” argument would allow Britain, which “waved the rules and ruled the waves” far more than China ever did, to claim rights over most of the world’s oceans and seas.

Without having the courage of conviction to go to an international court, China relies on using its superior hard and soft powers to press its claim against smaller Southeast Asian countries in the area. Against this pressure, Southeast Asian parties to the dispute need to improve their individual and collective strength but they also need support from major powers, such as the US, India, Japan, Russia and European Union.

For their own sake, the major powers must not abandon the South China Sea to be turned into a Chinese lake and Southeast Asian nations to fall into China’s orbit. That would be disastrous not only to the Southeast Asian countries but ultimately also to the major powers themselves and for the legal order over the ocean that the international community has tried so hard to establish since the 1980s.

(Source: Asia Times)

China demands return of boats from the Philippines

China on Thursday demanded the Philippines return small Chinese boats promptly and unconditionally after a Philippine military vessel confronted a Chinese fishing vessel.

“China has presented its stance to the Philippines. We demand that the Philippines return the small Chinese boats unconditionally and as soon as possible, and properly handle related issues,” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said at a daily press briefing.

On Tuesday, a Philippine military vessel entered the sea area neighboring the Liyue Tan, also known as the Reed Bank, of the Nansha archipelago in the South China Sea and tried to approach a Chinese fishing vessel towing 25 smaller, unoccupied boats, Jiang said.

The propeller of the Philippine vessel got tangled with the rope, disconnecting the Chinese fishing vessel from the 25 smaller boats.

“The Chinese fishermen and the fishing vessel are currently safe,” Jiang said.

She said China has undisputed sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and neighboring sea.

“It is completely justified for Chinese fishermen to fish in areas where generations of Chinese have fished,” Jiang said.

Jiang said the Philippines’ behavior impinged upon the legitimate rights of Chinese fishermen.

(Source: Chinadaily)

(Philippines) No apologies over ships�?collision

No apologies were necessary and none were given, Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert F. del Rosario stated yesterday on the wake of the reported “collision�?between a Chinese fishing vessel and a Philippine Navy patrol boat within the vicinity of the Recto Bank in the disputed West Philippine Sea (South China Sea) last Wednesday.

Recto Bank is within the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) but is also among the islets in the hotly contested Spratlys Group, also being claimed in whole or in part by China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan.

According to Del Rosario, the sequence of events that transpired before the patrol ship BRP Rizal, a PS-74, rammed the Chinese vessel clearly showed that it was an accident. “As I understand it, there was a Chinese fishing vessel towing 35 unmanned dinghies that strayed in our waters,�?he said. (Roy C. Mabasa)

(Source: Tempo)

Philippines refuses to return Chinese boats

The Philippine government has refused to return the 25 Chinese vessels that were taken in the South China Sea (also known as the West Philippine Sea) and the case is to be resolved with the help of a third party, a local paper said.

“The disposition of the small boats will be in accordance with a legal process,” Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert Del Rosario told the Star.

China has urged the Philippine government to respect the recently concluded China-Vietnam Joint Statement, in which they agreed to work bilaterally to resolve their disputes over contested claims within the South China Sea.

The China-Vietnam agreement should be used as a model in resolving disputes in the South China Sea, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Weimin told the Star, a hint that China does not want multilateral dialogue in resolving its disputes with the Philippines over contested claims in the South China Sea.

“The [agreement] demonstrates the resolve and will of the two parties, two countries and two peoples in enhancing friendly exchanges, expanding mutually beneficial cooperation, appropriately resolving disputes, forging ahead socialism and safeguarding regional and global peace, stability, cooperation and development,” Liu said.

Digression

The Philippines has opposed the China-Vietnam Joint Statement, which was signed during the state visit of the Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong to China on October 15.

The agreement has been seen by experts as a digression from the 2002 Code of Conduct signed by China and the ten member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian nations (Asean), that states disputes in the South China Sea should be handled multilaterally.

Despite China’s agreement to the 2002 Code of Conduct of claimants in the South China Sea, it has always insisted on bilateral dialogues between involved parties.

(Source: Gulfnews)

In “China’s demographic history and future challenges�?(special section on Population, Review, X. Peng, 29 July 2011, p. 581), the maps of China show a U-shaped curve enclosing most of the South China Sea and its islands (the Paracels and Spratlys), clearly implying that the colored area within the curve belongs to China. However, these islands are subject to territorial disputes between China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Taiwan. To show these islands unambiguously as Chinese territory is therefore questionable, especially when they are almost uninhabited and irrelevant to the population study in the Review.

The U-shaped curve in the map is even less justifiable. It appears only in Chinese maps and has been claimed by Chinese authors to represent China’s traditional maritime boundaries (1). It was used officially by China (2) to claim “sovereign rights and jurisdiction�?over the resources of the South China Sea. Wherever it appears, such as in Figure 1 from (2), this curve blatantly infringes other countries�?200–nautical-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) as recognized by international law (3). It extends beyond the mid-line between the disputed islands and other countries�?coastlines, and thus constitutes a much wider claim than the waters associated with these islands.

China’s unilateral claim over vast expanses of ocean is unprecedented in world history and violates the United Nations Law of the Sea (3), which all nations surrounding the South China Sea, including China, have ratified. That China pushes this claim seriously is not in doubt, as evidenced by recent incidents in which Chinese vessels harassed Vietnamese oil exploration ships well inside Vietnam’s EEZ (4).

No other nation recognizes China’s U-shaped maritime border. Indonesia and the Philippines have officially expressed concern (5, 6). The U.S. Senate passed a unanimous resolution deploring China’s actions (7). There is no justification for such a controversial, and, in terms of international law, illegal feature in a scholarly paper. One can only hope that its presence was not due to political pressure.

Tuan Quang Pham

School of Chemical Engineering, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2166, Australia.

Liem Nguyen, Minh Khanh Nguyen

Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA.

Tien Khoa Dao

Institute for Nuclear Science and Technology, Ha Noi, Vietnam.

Anh Tuan Kiet Hoang

Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique et aux Energie, Cadarache 13108, France.

Quang Thiep Lam

Thang Long University, Hanoi, Vietnam.

Suan Li Mai

Institute of Physics, Polish Academy of Sciences, 02-666 Warsaw, Poland.

Dang Hung Nguyen

University of Liege, 4000 Liege, Belgium.

Duc Hiep Nguyen

NSW Office of Environment and Heritage, Sydney, NSW 1232, Australia.

Van Hieu Nguyen

University of Technology and Management, Hanoi, Vietnam.

Luong Quang Nguyen

Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique et aux Energie, 91191 Saclay, France.

Thanh Van Tran

Université Paris-Sud, 91405 Orsay, France.

Duy-Thoai Pham

Charité University Medicine Berlin, Berlin, Germany.

References

1. J. Li, D. Li, Ocean Dev. Int. Law 34, 287 (2003).

2. China’s Communication to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), 7 May 2009; www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_m….

3. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm.

4. “Vietnam says China fishing boat rams research ship,�?The Straights Times, 9 June 2011; www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/SEAsia/Story/STIStory_678024.html.

5. Indonesia’s Communication to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), 8 July 2010; www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/idn_2010re_m….

6. The Philippines’s Communication to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), 5 April 2011; www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/phl_re_chn_2….

7. Sen. J. Webb, “U.S. Senate unanimously ‘deplores�?China’s use of force in South China Sea,�?27 June 2011; //webb.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/06-27-2011.cfm.

(Source: Sciencemag.org)

By François-Xavier Bonnet

Irasec’s Discussion Papers, No. 14, November 2012, 42 pages, www.irasec.com
 
Downloadable for Free:
//www.irasec.com/components/com_irasec/media/upload/DP14-ScarboroughShoal.pdf
 

Speaking to diplomats, businessmen and journalists at the British Foreign Office in November, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia emphasized the need for “norms and principles�?in resolving disputes in the South China Sea. Why did President Yudhoyono, who was spending a week in London at the invitation of Queen Elizabeth II as the first leader to visit Britain during the year of her Diamond Jubilee, feel that he had to bring up the South China Sea disputes at such a time?